We study how the optimal degree of conservatism relates to decisionmaking procedures in a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In our framework, central bank conservatism is required to attenuate the volatility of monetary decisions generated by the presence of uncertainty about the committee members' output objective. We show how this need for conservatism varies according to the number of MPC members, the MPC's composition as well as its decision rule. Moreover, we nd that extra central bank conservatism is required when there is ambiguity about the MPC's true decision rule.
1 Introduction yver the pst three dedesD inresing ttention hs een given to the prie stility ojetive in the dete out entrl nk designF st is now widely reognised tht entrl nk onservtism @gfgA plys ruil role in the hievement of this ojetiveD leit t the expense of higher output vriE ilityF he design of gfg providing n optiml trdeEo' etween in)tion nd output stilistion oviously depends on vrious ftorsD inluding for instne the struture of the eonomyD wge setting or (sl poliymkingF 1 his pper investigtes how the optiml hoie of entrl nk onserE vtism reltes to the olletive nture of monetry poliymkingF sn the reent pstD one hs indeed oserved widespred shift of the responsiility of monetry poliy from the single entrl nker to wonetry oliy gomE mittee @wgAF 2 wonetry poliy ommittees n di'er ording to severl spets inluding their ompositionD their deision rulesD the trnspreny of their deision mking @whether they pulish minutes nd voting reordsAD or the heterogeneities mong their memers @in terms of poliy preferenes nd skillsAF he ojetive of this pper is to study how these spets of the wg in)uene the optiml hoie of onservtismF his is done y mens of model of endogenous monetry poliy delegtion where the soil plnE ner hooses the wg9s degree of onservtism to minimise the soiety9s loss funtionF reneD the pper provides link etween the literture out optiml design of entrl nk ojetives nd olletive monetry poliyEmkingF he 1 Starting with Rogo's (1985) seminal paper, a huge literature has explored the optimal type of the single central banker in terms of ination aversion (see Siklos 2008 or Hayo and Hefeker 2010 for recent surveys). 2 As Blinder (2004) notes, there are only four central banks where policy is formulated by a single governor: Canada, Malta, New Zealand, and Norway. For an overview of central bank boards around the world and their characteristics, see Berger and Nitsch (2011) and Lybek and Morris (2004) . P ltter hs grown rpidly in reent yersD fousing on di'erent issuesF ome ontriutions study the welfre onsequenes of di'erent types of olletive deisionEmking proedure in monetry unionD suh s the reltive weights tht regionl nd ommon developments should reeiveF his is the se of on rgen nd üppel @IWWRAD heqruwe @PHHHAD refeker @PHHQAD wtsen nd oislnd @PHHSAD ptum @PHHTAD wéon @PHHVA nd prvque et lF @PHHWA who onsider struturl heterogeneities ross union memer ountries s well s di'erenes in their eonomi shoksF enother rnh of this literture llows for the possiility tht wg memers fe some unertinty when tking their deisionsF illmnn @PHIHAD for instneD onsiders unertinty out the model tht est desries the eonomyD wheres qerlhEuristen @PHHTA ssumes tht poliymkers re unertin out the stte of the eonomyF pousing on the di'erenes in skills mong wg memersD qerlhEuristen @PHHVA demonstrtes tht onsensus will e otined more esily when the wg is heded y hirmn who is more skilled thn the other memersF eferenes tht expliitly fous on heterogeneity in the memers preferenes out in)tion nd output nd how this reltes to their voting re ghppell et lF @PHHSAD rrris et lF @PHIIAD qöhlmnn nd uel @PHHUAD fesley et lF @PHHVAD wontoro @PHHUA or ioni nd ugeEwuri @PHHVD PHIHAF sn prtiulrD ioni nd ugeEwuri @PHHVA study heterogeneity in poliy preferenes mong ommittee memers using individul voting reords of the wg of the fnk of inglndF heir results indite tht there re systemti di'erenes in the wg memers9 reommendtions whih n e explined y their reer kground nd the nture of theirmemership @iFeF whether they re internl or externl memersAF roweverD most of this literture ssumes tht the poliymkers9 diverE gent preferenes s well s the wg9s deision rule re perfetly known y Q thepuliF 3 his ssumption seems justi(ed when onsidering the se of highly trnsprent entrl nk whih pulishes minutes nd voting reords ! like the fnk of inglndD for instne ! nd where the deisionEmking mehnism hs een lerly spei(edF roweverD in the se of less trnsE prent entrl nkD there my e some miguity out the poliymkers9 preferenes nd the wg9s deision proedureF 4 por the se of the iuroE pen gentrl fnk @igfAD for instneD no suh voting reords re pulishedF husD von rgen nd frükner @PHHIAD ioni nd ugeEqri @PHIHA nd ryo nd wéon @PHIIA im to estimte its deision mking rule empirillyF hile ioni nd ugeEqri @PHIHA rgue tht it follows onsensus ruleD ryo nd wéon @PHIIA onlude tht the igf seems to implement qhE weighted rgining proessF sn this pperD we expliitly tke ount of the miguity tht my exist round the wg9s deisionEmking when exmining the optiml hoie of entrl nk onservtismF wo types of unertinty re ddressedF pirstD we onsider miguity out the wg memers9 preferenes whih ould e explined y lk of entrl nk political transparencyF 5 es in pust nd vensson @PHHID PHHPAD tensen @PHHPA ndestelius @PHHWAD we ssume tht this unertinty onerns the poliymkers9 output gp trgetF eondlyD we llow for unertinty out the wg9s deision mehnismF ht isD the puli nd the soil plnner do not know how divergent preferenes of ord memers re ggregtedF his unertinty ould e due to lk of entrl nk procedural transparency in the sense tht the entrl nk does not 3 Important exceptions are the papers of Sibert (2003) and Mihov and Sibert(2006) who examine how the MPC structure is likely to aect the members' incentives to gain reputation for anti-ination toughness. 4 Hayo and Mazhar (2011) study the determinants of the degree of MPC transparency. They nd that past ination and the quality of institutional set up signicantly inuence MPC transparency. 5 For a typology of the dierent aspects of central bank transparency, see Geraats (2002) .
ommunite how monetry poliy deisions re tkenF es entrl resultD it is shown tht oth types of unertinty inrese the need for onservtismF pers y feetsm nd tensen @IWWVAD wustelli @IWWWA nd refeker nd immer @PHHWA exmine the implitions of unertin preferenes for the optiml degree of onservtism of single entrl nkerF vike we doD they demonstrte tht some extr onservtism my e required in the presene of preferene unertinty euse it helps to ttenute the higher voltility of monetry deisionsF sn dditionD we show how this need depends on the olletive deisionEmking proedure in the wgF sn prtiulrD we (nd tht the extr onservtism tht is needed to ompenste for preferene unerE tinty is delining in the numer of wg memersF ht isD lrger nd more politilly trnsprent wgs need less onservtive memers nd ould e more tiveF sn other wordsD the lk of entrl nk trnspreny omes t the ost of less output stiliztion euse entrl nkers should e more onservtiveF e lso (nd tht the optiml degree of onservtism vries ording to the wg9s deision ruleF e onsider lterntive deisionEmking proeE duresX the 4single entrl nker se4 ! whih we refer to s the enhmrk se ! 4verging4 nd 4voting4F he ltter ssumes tht the wg9s inE dividul monetry deisions orrespond to the medin memer9s deisionD wheres the verging proedure implements the men of the wg memE ers9 deisionF e show tht the voting rule systemtilly requires higher degree of gfg thn the verging ruleF sn more generl seD where the wg9s deisions re sed on omintion of these stylised deision rulesD we determine the optiml deision powerEshring in the wg tht minimises the need foronservtismF e (nd tht it depends on the degree of preferene unertinty s well s on the size of the di'erent deision odies in the wgF S hen onsidering the se of unertinty out the wg9s deision mehE nismD we refer to the 4roust delegtion4 onept developed y illmnn @PHHWAF 6 wore formllyD we ssume tht the soil plnner is unle to deE (ne ny proility distriution over the set of possile deision rulesF o hedge ginst this unertintyD he dopts minmx strtegy whih onsists in seleting the level of onservtism so s to minimise the mximum welfre loss tht ould our due to unertinty out the wg9s deision ruleF sn other wordsD the roustnessEonerned plnner hooses the degree of onserE vtism tht is roust to the worstEse deision mehnismF his leds him to overestimte the voltility of monetry deisions nd therey to hoose high degree of onservtismF st (nlly ppers tht the lk of trnspreny out the wg9s deision mehnism retes some extr need for onserE vtismF e otin similr onlusion when using fyesin pproh to unertinty out the wg deision proessF he reminder of the pper is strutured s followsF etion P desries the model of the eonomy wheres setion Q presents monetry poliy deE isions in the wgF efter presenting the single entrl nker se s enhmrkD we exmine monetry poliy under lterntive deisionEmking proeduresF etion R nlyses the optiml hoie of onservtism in wgD depending on whether the ommittee9s deision mehnism hs een lerly spei(ed or notF pinllyD setion S summrises our results nd onludesF 2 The model yur si set up is simple xewEueynesin model @seeD for instneD glrid et lFD IWWW or oodfordD PHHQA tht is extended to llow for unertinty out the poliymkers9 preferenesF he development of in)tion is derived under the ssumption of monopolisti ompetition where optimizing (rms djust their pries in stggeredD overlpping wyF he ggregte supply urve is thus represented y forwrdElooking hillips urveX
where π t is the in)tion rteD x t is the output gp de(ned s output reltive to its equilirium level under )exile pries @normlized to zeroAD nd E t π t+1 is the expeted future in)tion rte @with E t denoting the expettions operE torAF he disount ftor is denoted y β nd the sensitivity of in)tion to the output gp is mesured y αF he lrger is the vlue of αD the greter is the (rms9 ility to djust their pries in response to hnges in the urrent output gpF pinllyD e t represents ost push shok whih exhiits some degree of persistene mesured y the oe0ient 0 ≤ ρ < 1X e t = ρe t−1 + µ t with µ t ∼ N (0, 1) @PA he soil plnner ims to minimise loss funtion de(ned over in)tion nd the output gpX
where λ G mesures the soil plnner9s reltive onern with prie stilityF e refer to @QA s the soil plnner or the soiety9s loss funtionF wonetry deisions re tken y wonetry oliy gommittee @wgA U omposed of n memers indexed y i @i = 1, ..., nAF vike the soil plnE nerD monetry poliymkers seek prie stility nd output gp stilistionF referenes of wg memer i re summrised s followsX
@RA where λ CB denotes the wg9s degree of onservtism nd i t memer i9s stohsti output gp trgetD with E( i t ) = 0 nd V ( i t ) = σ 2 F 7 he key feture of our model is tht eh individul poliymker9s output gp trget is not perfetly known y the soil plnner nd the puliF his ide is ptured y the presene of the rndom vrile i t F eording to the sttisE til properties of this preferene shokD the poliymkers9 output gp trget oinides on verge with the soil plnner9s one ut there is still some unE ertinty round it whih is mesured y σ 2 F he lrger is σ 2 D the higher is the unertinty surrounding the poliymkers9 output gp trgetF his kind of preferene unertinty n e interpreted in severl wysF he preferene shok i my represent idiosynrti entrl nker preferE enes tht re not fully known y the soil plnner either euse the poliE ymkers do not lerly revel them or euse of high turnoverrteF hese idiosynrsies n for instne stem from the poliymkers reer kground ! s suggested y ioni nd ugeEwuri @PHHVA nd prvque et lF @PHIIA ! or the nture of their memership in the wg @whether they re internl or externl memersAF sn the se of monetry union where the wg of ommon entrl nk is omposed of ntionl representtivesD these idiosynE rsies might re)et the memer ountries9 heterogeneous eonomi situtionF en lterntive explntion would e the one proposed y estelius @PHHWAD suggesting tht the poliymkers9 unertin output gp trget re)ets their mesurement errors of the potentil output levelF 8 he timing of events within the model is s followsF he (rst stge reltes to the monetry regime design where the soil plnner hooses the poliymkers9 ommon degree of onservtism λ CB F sn the seond stgeD monetry poliy is implemented nd eonomi outomes re relizedF he gme is solved y kwrd indutionF 3 Monetary policymaking in the MPC his setion presents di'erent deisions rules tht n e dopted y enE trl nkF e (rst onsider some stylised deision rules suh s the single poliymker seD the verging rule nd the mjority ruleF e then turn to the more generl se where monetry poliy is the result of omintion of these deision rulesF
Stylised decision rules
The single policymaker case ithin the wgD monetry poliy n e set ording to di'erent deision proeduresF e (rst investigte the simplest se where one of the poliE ymkers @wg memer iA tkes deisions for the whole wgF e hene ssume tht he is in)uentil enough to impose his own judgement nd prefE erenes so tht he hs omplete disretion in deiding monetry poliyF his n e due for instne to his leder position in the ommittee or his high experiene nd skillsF nder this deision mehnismD monetry poliy results from the minimiE stion of loss funtion @RA sujet to the hillips urve @IA tking in)tion expettions s givenF he resulting (rst order ondition n e writtenX
where supersript CBi refers to the single entrl nker i9s monetry deiE sionF eording to this optimlity onditionD monetry poliy positively deE pends on i t D the deisionEmker9s stohsti output gp trgetF e positive relistion of i t for exmple ! whih mens either tht the poliymker overE estimtes the eonomy9s output potentil or tht he hs n overEmitious output gp trget ! indues him to implement n expnsive monetry poliy nd therey leds to n expnsion of the eonomyF The averaging rule nder the verging ruleD it is ssumed tht efore deiding out monE etry poliyD wg memers gree on ommon preferene shok¯ t tht orresponds to the verge of individul preferene shoksX AR
where supersript AR denotes the verging ruleF reneD the loss funtion tht governs the deisions of the wg under the verging rule n e desried s followsX
@TA winimising loss funtion @TA under the onstrint of eqution @IA nd tking in)tion expettions s given yields the following optiml retion
@UA en lterntive to ggregting the rguments in the wg9s loss funE tion would e to ggregte the wg memers9 individul loss funtions @L AR t = n i=1 L CB,i t /nA or to tke the verge of the individul optiml deiE sions @x AR t = n i=1 x CBi t /nAF wtsen nd oislnd @PHHSA refer to the former deision mehnism s the 4fenthmite rule4 nd to the ltter s the 4onE sensus rule4F sn our modelD oth rules led to similr result s the one given y eqution @UAF his is euse we onsider only one kind of symmetry mong wg memers hereD nmely symmetri preferene shoksF
The majority rule e (nlly exmine the se where the monetry poliy ommittee resorts to mjority votingF o formlize this deision mehnismD we ssume tht ll wg memers hve equl voting powerF henD the medin voter theorem pplies nd the implemented monetry poliy orresponds to the medin poliymker9s optiml deision whih is given yX
The general case sn prtieD the wg my not neessrily use one of the stylized deision rules desried oveF st my rther resort to omintion of these rulesF sndeedD the wg my e omposed of internl memers ! like the hirmn or memers of the exeutive ord ! nd externl memers ! like demi experts or lol entrl nk representtives in the se of federl entrl nk Y monetry poliy deisions my thus hve elements from ll the deision rules onsidered oveF sn this seD the wg9s loss funtion n e desried yX
Y GEN refers to the generl seF rmeter p @p ∈ [0, 1]A n e seen s the hirmn9s reltive deision power wheres (1 − p) desries the ounil9s reltive shre in the wgF reneD we here ssume tht the wg deisions onsist in weighted omintion of the hirmn9s deisions nd the deisions of ounilF he hirmn is indexed y chair nd his preferene shoks re desried y chair D with E( chair t ) = 0 nd V ( chair t ) = σ 2 chair F sn dditionD we onsider ounil tht is omposed of ord of internl memersD indexed y b @b = 1, ..., n b AD nd externl memers ! demi experts or regionl representtives in the se of federl entrl nk !D indexed y ext @i = 1, ..., n ext AF 9 referene shoks of eh individual ord memer re de(ned
ext F e ssume tht externl memers hve to resort to voting wheres ord memers n esily shre ommon view nd thus reh deisions y onsenE sus @whih in our frmework is ptured y the verging ruleAF rmeter 9 Obviously, n b + n ext = n so that the MPC is formed by n + 1 members. q @q ∈ [0, 1]A represents the ord9s reltive shre in the ounilF 10 winimising expression @WA with respet to x GEN t D we otin the wg9s retion funtion whih n e written s weighted omintion of expresE sions @SAD @UA nd @VAX
Optimal delegation in the MPC sn this setionD we exmine the hoie of the optiml degree of entrl nk onservtism λ * CB in wgF o do soD we onsider model of endogenous delegtion where the soil plnner selets the poliymkers9 ommon degree of onservtism λ CB to minimise the expeted soil lossF his ltter depends on the equilirium output gp nd in)tion rte oserved under the lterE ntive deision rulesF fy omining the hillips urve @IA with the optiml monetry poliy rules given y expressions @SAD @UAD @VA nd @IHAD we otin respetivelyX
where j = CBi, ARD M R or GEN F nsurprisinglyD the equilirium output gp nd in)tion rte depend on the entrl nkers9 stohsti output gp trgets nd thus on the wy these 10 Parameter q can also be seen as a binary number where a value of 1 (0) implies that council members resort to averaging (voting). Another interpretation of q would be that it represents the probability that the council reaches a consensus ; (1 − q) being the probability that the council fails to reach a consensus, in which case, it has to resort to voting. Obviously, with both interpretations of q, no distinction is made between board and external members within the council so that n b = n ext = n and b t = ext t .
re ggregted through the wg deision proedureF woreoverD s expresE sions @IIA nd @IPA revelD the trnsmission of ostEpush shoks e t to the output gp nd in)tion rte is not 'eted y these preferene shoks j t F his is explined y the ft tht the preferene shoks onern the poliyE mkers9 trgets nd not the reltive weight they give to their ojetivesF sntegrting expressions @IIA nd @IPA into iqF @QA nd tking expettions yields the following expeted soil lossX
@IQA he (rst term of iqF @IQA is due to the in)tion nd output gp voltility rising from the unertinty out the poliymkers9 output gp trgetF he seond term orresponds to the mroeonomi voltility relted to ostEpush shoksF xextD our ojetive is to investigte the optiml delegtion implitions of olletive monetry poliymkingF sn prtiulrD we wnt to study how the optiml degree of onservtism is in)uened y the design of the wg in terms of its sizeD its deision ruleD nd in terms of its trnspreny out the deision struture ! iFeF the wg9s dislosure of its deision struture @p nd qAF sn the generl seD we hene distinguish etween two ses depending on whether the wg9s deision struture is lerly spei(ed or notF sn the following susetionD we (rst investigte the optiml degree of onservtism when the wg dopts some stylised deision rules eforeD in the next susetionD turning to the generl seF 4.1
Optimal delegation under stylised decision rules o determine the optiml degree of onservtism λ * CB D we minimise the exE peted soil loss @IQA with respet to λ CB nd otin the following (rst order onditionX
@IRA he (rst term in @IRA is lwys negtiveF his re)ets the ft tht greter onservtism redues the voltility rising from the poliymkers9 unertin output gp trgetF he seond term n e positive or negtive nd inreses with the size of λ CB * F his term highlights the trdeEo' etween in)tion nd output gp stilistion rising from the optiml hoie of λ CB X higher λ CB implies etter in)tion stilistion ut t the ost of less output gp stilistionF ine the (rst term is negtiveD the optiml λ CB must e lrge enough for the seond term to eome positiveF reneD in the presene of unertinty out the poliymkers9 true preferenes some extr onservtism is requiredD depending on the deision proedure tht hs een dopted in the wgF woreoverD the lrger is the preferene unertintyD the higher is the level of optiml onservtism nd the lower is output gp stilistionF ewriting the (rst order ondition @IRAD we hveX
@ISA es n e seen from this expressionD the need for onservtism @iFeF the ft tht λ CB * > λ G A t this stge of our nlysis stems from the presene of othD shok persistene ρ nd unertinty out the poliymkers9 preferE IS enes V ( j t )F o determine the optiml degree of entrl nk onservtism λ CB * D we use grphil methodF
RS¦ pigure IX hetermintion of the optiml degree of onservtism pigure I represents funtion f (λ CB ) on the right hnd side of iqF @ISAF 11 he leftEhnd side of iqF @ISA is RS¦line through the originF he interseE tion point etween the RS¦line nd funtion f urve gives the optiml degree of entrl nk onservtism λ j CB * F prom this grphil nlysisD we derive the following resultX Result 1: When there is uncertainty about the policymakers' true preferences, i) the MPC should always be more conservative than society, even if cost push shocks are not persistent, ii A the single policymaker case leads to the highest need for conservatism, iii) the need for conservatism decreases with the number of MPC members, 11 Studying the properties of this function, we observe that:
becomes negative implying that f (λ CB ) is concave for suciently low values of β and ρ and/or suciently large values of λ CB and α.
IT iv) averaging requires less conservatism than votingF
Proof: ee ppendixF o understnd the intuition underlying this resultD we must hve in mind tht when the entrl nkers9 preferenes re not fully known y the puliD extr onservtism is required to ttenute the susequent mroeonomi voltilityF 12 eordinglyD in the presene of this unertintyD theentrl nk should lwys e more onservtive thn soietyD independent of whether ost push shoks re persistent or notF his result extends erlier (ndings of illmnn @PHHWA where the need for onservtism hinges on the persistene of ost push shoksF esult I provides further preision y showing how the mroeonomi voltility generted y unertin entrl nker preferenes depends on the struture of the wgD the numer of memers nd the dopted deision proE edureF wore spei(llyD we (nd tht the single poliymker se yields the highest vrine of in)tion nd the output gpD followed y mjority ruleD while the verging rule leds to the lowest mroeonomi voltilityF his is due to the ft tht the deisions of ommittee reless voltile thn the deisions of single poliymkerF end the lrger the ommitteeD the lower this voltilityF 13 he lrge size of the ommittee helps indeed to weken exE treme positions of individul memersF purthermoreD while the deisions of the ommittee9s medin memer n never e extreme deisions @s it my e the se with single deisionEmkerAD they re however more voltile thn the deisions of the verge memerF he mjority rule therefore reE tes some extr voltility ompred to the verging rule nd the smller is the size of the ommitteeD the higher is this extr voltilityF pinllyD s the mroeonomi voltility depends on the struture of the wgD so does the resulting need for onservtismF gonsequentlyD the ltter is higher with single entrl nker thn with ommittee ndD in the se of olletive monetry poliymkingD resorting to mjority voting requires higher level of onservtism thn resorting to vergingF 4.2 Optimal delegation in the general case e next onsider the generl se where the wg is omposed of hirmn nd ounil of memersD resorting to verging ndGor to votingF The MPC's decision structure is known e (rst turn to the se where the soil plnner knows the wg9s strutureD iFeF the reltive in)uene of the hirmn @pA nd the powerEshring mong the ounil memers @qAF he nlysis of the optiml degree of onservtism leds to the following resultX Result 2: There exists an optimal decision structure p min = Proof ee ppendixF IV es is ovious from result PD the optiml weight for the hirmnD p min D is deresing in the degree of unertinty out his preferenes σ 2 chair F he optiml weight p min lso depends on the ounil9s prmetersX p min is deE resing in nD the numer of ounil memersnd inresing in σ 2 b nd σ 2 ext D the degrees of unertinty out the ounil memers9 @ord nd externl memersA preferenesF his n e explined y the ft tht the vrine of the ounil9s deisions flls with respet to its size n ut inreses in σ 2 b nd σ 2 ext F woreoverD the lower the voltility of the ounil9s deisionsD the higher should e its deision power ompred to the hirmnF e similr nlysis n e developed to explin why the ord9s optiml reltive weight q min is deresing in the numer of externl memers n ext nd inresing in the externl memers preferene unertinty σ 2 ext F woreoverD s neither p min nor q min hve extreme vlues @H or IAD giving full monetry power to single poliymker or group of poliymkers with similr preferene unertinty @σ 2 A ndGor who resort to unique deision rule does not pper to e n optiml deision shemeF his result lls for some diversity within the wgD in terms of preferene unertinty s well s in terms of deision ruleF reneD if soiety wnts to ttenute the voltility of wg deisions nd therey the need for onservtismD it is in its interest to llote the deision power mong di'erent memers who exhiit some heterogeneity in their degree of preferene unertinty σ 2 ndGor who resort to di'erent deision rulesF yviouslyD the llotion sheme should e sed on the poliymkers9 level of preferene unertintyX the lower this ltterD the higher should e their deision power within the ommitteeF IW The MPC's decision structure is unknown ntil nowD we hve ssumed tht the soil plnner perfetly knows the wg9s deision proedureF etD entrl nks re not neessrily fully trnsE prent out the wy their monetry poliy deisions re tkenF hen iniE tilly the deision proedure hs not een lerly spei(ed ndGor if the entrl nk does not revel monetry poliy deliertions through the puE lition of minutes nd voting reords ! s it is the se for the igf ! the wg deision mehnism remins unertin for the soil plnner @s well s the puli in generlAF e thus onsider next the se where the soil plnnerD when deterE mining the optiml level of onservtismD is unertin out the wg9s true deision proedureD in prtiulr the reltive weights of the hirmn nd ounil memers @p nd qAF his does not menD howeverD tht the soil plnner is not informed out the omposition of the wgF st only mens tht he knows neither the deision power of the hirmn nd the ounilD nor how the ltter rehes deision ! whether y verging or y votingF re only knows tht p nd q oth lie in n intervl ounded y zero nd unityF e lso ssume tht he is unle to formulteD in the initil stgeD ny proility distriution of possile reliztions of p nd qF o ddress this unertintyD he my wnt to determine roust delegtion shemeD iFeF to determine λ * CB so tht it is roust ginst the worst possile senrio of poliymking in the wgF his ltter orresponds to the deision mehnism p, q tht leds to the highest expeted soil lossF wore formllyD to determine the optiml delegtion prmeter λ * CB D he dopts minEmx pproh whih onsists in solving the following prolemX
Y p U N nd q U N de(ne respetively the unknown hirmn9s deision power nd the unknown ord9s deision powerF he equilirium output gp nd in)tion when then wg9s deision struture is unknown re respetively desried yX
@IVA he nlysis of prolem @ITA9s solution yields the followingresultX
Result 3: The lack of transparency about the MPC's decision procedure leads the robustness-concerned social planner to overestimate the need for conservatism.
Proof ee ppendixF reneD when the ommittee9s deision proedure hs not een lerly spei(edD the soil plnner voluntrily overestimtes preferene unertinty nd the resulting mroeonomi voltilityF his oliges him to set n rti(E illy high degree of onservtismF es onsequeneD the lk of proedurl trnspreny seems to rete some extr need for onservtismF yne ould however rgue tht this result hinges on the roust minEmx pproh whih leds the soil plnner to onsider the worstEse senrio nd thus to exE ggerte the importne of the voltility of monetry deisionF ht is why we develop n lterntive method to pture the ide of unertinty in the wg9s deision struture y dopting fyesin pprohF PI rereD the soil plnner is ssumed to hve some informtion out the wg deision proedure ut is unertin out itF his ouldD for instneD re)et the se where the wg pulily nnounes its deision struture @p nd qA ut does not pulish minutes so tht these nnounements n not e on(rmedF eordinglyD we ssume tht the soil plnner is le to ssign prior on p nd q whih is however sujet to white noise disturnesX
@PHA where σ 2 η nd σ 2 µ respetively represent the degrees of unertinty surrounding the hirmn9s nd the ord9s reltive deision powerF nder this spei(tionD the expeted soil loss funtion writesX
2n ext eording to this expressionD the presene of unertinty out the wg9s deision struture @σ 2 η nd σ 2 µ A exertes the voltility of monetry deisions nd therey indues the soil plnner to hoose higher level of onservtism thn under ertintyF foth pprohes @roust ontrol nd yesinA to unertinty out the wg deision struture hene led to the sme onlusionD showing tht lk of proedurl trnspreny indues the soil plnner to hoose higher PP onservtismF 5 Concluding remarks his pper provides insights into how optiml onservtism reltes to the olletive deisionEmking proess in wgF e expliitly tke ount of two types of unertinty tht my hrterise deisionEmking within ommitteeF wore preiselyD we ssume tht when hoosing the optiml degree of gfgD the soil plnner is likely to fe some unertinty out the wg memers9 heterogeneous preferenes s well s out the wg9s deisionE mking proedureF ithin this frmeworkD we (rst demonstrte tht more preferene unerE tinty should e ompensted through more onservtismF sndeedD preferene unertinty retes voltility of monetry deisions nd higher onservtism helps to ttenute this e'et t the prie however of less output gp stilE istionF sn dditionD we show tht this extr onservtism tht is needed to ompenste for preferene unertinty is delining in the numer of wg memersF ht isD lrger nd more trnsprent wg need less onservtive memersF en pplition to the se of the igfD whih is one of the entrl nks with the lrgest wgsD nd rguly lso one of the less trnsprent entrl nksD would hene suggest tht reform e'orts tht im to redue the size of the wg re not neessrily ostlessD even if they inrese e0ienyF he lrge size of the ommittee indeed helps to ttenute extreme positions of heterogeneous poliymkersF elsoD we (nd tht when the wg memers resort to votingD the need for onservtism is higher thn when they resort to vergingF e more generl deisionEmking proess where wg deisions re sed on omintion ofthese stylised deision rules revels tht onentrting the full deision power in the hnds of single poliymker or group of identil poliyE mkers is not optimlF o minimise the voltility of monetry deisions nd therey the need for onservtismD room should e left for diversity within the ommitteeD in terms of preferene unertinty nd of deision rulesF pinllyD we hve llowed for lk of proedurl trnspreny whih trnsE ltes into some miguity out the spei(tion of the wg9s deision ruleF e hve ssumed tht the soil plnner ddresses this kind of unertinty y following roust delegtion pprohF his onsists in hoosing level of onservtism whih is roust to the worst possile deision mehnism tht the wg might doptD iFeF to the deision mehnism tht yields the highest welfre lossF e show thtD in this ontextD the roustnessEonerned soil plnner is indued to overestimte the voltility of monetry deisions nd therey to set higher level of onservtism thn under full proedurl trnsE prenyF e similr onlusion is otined when using fyesin pproh where the soil plnner is le to formulte proility distriution over the unertin llotion of deision powerF yur (ndings eventully highlight the importne of tking into ount the voltility tht my rise from olletive monetry poliymking for the optiml design of entrl nk onservtismF etD it should e kept in mind tht our nlysis only fouses on one dimension of the dete nd one should thus e reful to drw immedite poliy onsequenes from itF roweverD we feel tht the intertion etween olletive monetry poliymking nd other importnt issues ! like entrl nk trnspreny nd optiml monetry delegtion ! hs een insu0iently reserhedF his pper mkes (rst step t (lling this gpF PR Appendix Proof of Result 1: prom expression @ISAD it is esy to see tht ∂f
uses n upwrd shift of the funtion f nd therey shift to the right of the intersetion point etween the RS¦line nd the funtion f urveD implying n inrese in λ CB * F es AR t = n i i t /nD the ggregtion proess impliesX E( AR t ) = 0 nd 
PS
hi'erentiting this expression with respet to p yieldsX
nd the optiml degree of onservtism λ GEN CB * s wellF e then turn to the ounil nd di'erentite V ( GEN t ) with respet to qF sn doing thisD we otin X o solve prolem @ITAD the (rst stge is to identify the reliztions of (p U N , q U N ) tht mximise the expeted soil lossX
only depends on p U N nd q U N vi E( U N t ) 2 F he soil plnner (rst determines the llotion of deision power within the ounil tht mximises the expeted soil lossF hi'erentiting E( U N t ) 2 with respet to q U N yields
es hs lredy een demonstrtedD for given pD E( U N t ) 2 ttins its minimum for q min = Πσ 2 ext 2n ext σ 2 b n b + Πσ 2 ext 2n ext nd thus its mximum for extreme vlues
! is equl to H @IAF yne q max hs een determinedD the soil plnner turns to p max D the vlue of p tht mximises E( U N t ) 2 nd thus E[L G king the derivtive of E( U N t ) 2 with respet to p U N yields
! the ltter eing de(ned y @PPA ! whih mens tht the optiml degree of onservtismD λ U N CB * D when the wg9s deision proedure is unknown is higher thn λ GEN CB * D the one otined under trnspreny out the deision proedureF References feetsmD F nd rF tensen @IWWVAF 4sn)tion trgets nd ontrts with unertin entrl nker preferenesF4 tournl of woneyD gredit nd fnking QHD QVR!RHQF fergerD rF @PHHTAF 4yptiml entrl nk designX fenhmrks for the igfF4 eview of snterntionl yrgniztion ID PHU!PQSF fergerD rF nd F xitsh @PHIIAF 4oo mny ookscX ommittees in monetry poliyF4 outhern ionomi tournl UVD RSPERUSF fesleyD FD xF weds nd F urio @PHHVAF 4ixpertise nd mroeoE nomi poliy insiders versus outsiders in monetry poliymkingF4 emerin ionomi eviewX pers nd roeedings WVD PIV!PPQ flinderD eF @PHHRAF he uiet evolutionF gentrl fnking goes wodernF leX le niversity ressF ghppellD rF FD F F wqregor nd F ermilye @PHHSAF gommittee deisions on monetry poliyF gmridgeX ws ressF glrid FD tF qli nd wF qertler @IWWWAF 4he siene of monetry poliyX e new keynesin perspetiveF4 tournl of ionomi viterture QUD ITTIEIUHUF he qruweD F @PHHHAF 4wonetry poliy in the presene of symmetriesF4 tournl of gommon wrket tudies QVD SWQETIPF prvqueD iFD rF rmmdou nd F tnek @PHIIAF 4eleting your in)E tion trgetersX fkground nd performne of monetry poliy ommittee memersF4 qermn ionomi eview IPD PPQ!PQVF prvqueD iFD xF wtsued nd FqF wéon @PHHWAF 4row monetry poliy impts the voltility of poliy rtesF4 tournl of wroeonomis QID SQRE SRTF ptumD F @PHHTAF 4yne monetry poliy nd IV entrl nkersX he PV europen monetry poliy s gme of strtegi delegtionF4 tournl of wonetry ionomis SQD TSW!TTWF qertsD F @PHHPAF 4gentrl fnk rnsprenyF4 ionomi tournl IIPD SQPESTSF qerlhEuristenD F @PHHTAF 4wonetry poliy ommittes nd interest rte settingF4 iuropen ionomi eview SHD RVUESHUF qerlhEuristenD F @PHHVAF 4he role of the hirmn in setting moneE try poliyX sndividulisti vs utortilly ollegil wgsF4 snterntionl tournl of gentrl fnking RD IIWEIRQF qöhlmnnD F nd F uel @PHHUAF 4he edutionl nd professionl kground of entrl nkers nd its e'et on in)tionX en empiril nlE ysisF4 iuropen ionomi eview SID WPS!WRIF rnsenD vFF nd FtF rgent @PHHSAF 4oust estimtion nd ontrol underommitmentF4 tournl of ionomi heory IPRD PSV!QHIF rnsenD vFF nd FtF rgent @PHHVAF oustnessF rineton niversity ressD rinetonF rrrisD wFD F vevine nd gF pener @PHIIAF 4e dede of dissentX ixE plining the dissent voting ehvior of fnk of inglnd wg memersF4 uli ghoie IRTD RIQERRPF ryoD fF nd F wzhr @PHIIAF 4wonetry poliy ommittee trnsE prenyX wesurementD determinntsD nd eonomi e'etsF4 wequ hisE ussion perD xoF RHEPHIIF ryoD fF nd FEqF wéon @PHIIAF 4fehind losed doorsX eveling the igf9s deision ruleF4 wequ hisussion perD xoF QSEPHIIF refekerD gF @PHHQAF 4pederl monetry poliyF4 ndinvin tournl of ionomis IHSD TRQETSWF refekerD gF nd fF immer @PHHWAF 4he optiml hoie of entrl indeE PW pendene nd onservtism under unertintyF4 tournl of wroeonomis QQD SWSETHTF vyekD F nd tF worris @PHHRAF 4gentrl nk governneX e survey of ords nd mngementF4 swp orking per HRGPPTF wtsenD iF nd yF oislnd @PHHSAF 4snterest rte deisions in n symE metri monetry unionF4 iuropen tournl of olitil ionomy PID QTSEQVRF wéonD FEqF @PHHVAF 4wjority voting my not rule @in monetry unionsAX e omment on wtsen nd øislnd iurF tF olitil ionomy PI @PHHSA QTSEQVRF4 iuropen tournl of olitil ionomy PRD PTWEPUWF wihovD sF nd eF iert @PHHTAF 4grediility nd )exiility with indepenE dent monetry poliy ommitteeF4 tournl of woneyD gredit nd fnking QVD PQERTF wontoroD gF @PHHUAF 4wonetry poliy ommittees nd interest rte smoothingF4 gi hisussion per HUVHD vondon hool of ionomisF wustelli eF @IWWWAF 4sn)tion ontrts nd in sn)tion trgets under unertintyX hy we might need onservtive entrl nkersF4 ionomi TTD PRI!PSRF yrphnidesD eF nd F vn xorden @PHHPAF 4he unreliility of outputE gp estimtes in rel timeF4 eview of ionomis nd ttistis VRD STW!SVQF ioniD eF nd pF ugeEwri @PHHVAF 4he dynmi @inAe0ieny of monetry poliy y ommitteeF4 tournl of woneyD gredit nd fnking RHD IHHIEIHQPF ioniD eF nd pF ugeEwuri @PHIHAF 4wonetry poliy y ommitteeX gonsensusD hirmn dominneD or simple mjorityc4 urterly tournl of ionomis IPSD QTQ!RITF ogo'D uF @IWVSAF 4he optiml degree of ommitment to monetry trgetF4 urterly tournl ionomis IHHD IITW!IIWHF QH iertD eF @PHHQAF 4wonetry poliy ommitteesX individul nd olletive reputtionsF4 eview of ionomi tudy UHD TRW!TTSF orgeD wF wF @PHIQA 4oust delegtion with unertin monetry poliy preferenesF4 ionomi wodelling QHD UQ!UVF illmnnD F @PHHWAF 4yptiml monetry poliy with n unertin ost hnnelF4 tournl of woneyD gredit nd fnking RID VVSEWHTF illmnnD F @PHHWAF 4he stiliztion is nd roust monetry poliy delegtionF4 tournl of wroeonomis QID UQHEUQRF illmnnD F @PHIHAF 4wonetry poliy ommittees nd model unerE tintyF4 hisussion per wequD PIEPHIHF von rgenD tF nd wF frükner @PHHIAF 4wonetry poliy in unknown territoryX he europen entrl nk in the erly yersF4 is orking pers f IVEPHHID niversity of fonnF von rgenD tF nd F üppel @IWWRAF 4gentrl nk onstitution for federl monetry unionsF4 iuropen ionomi eview RVD UUREUVPF oodford wF @PHHQAF snterest nd priesX poundtions of theory of monetry poliyF rinetonX rineton niversity ressF
